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The Concealments of Carbon Markets and the 
Publicity of Love in a Time of Climate Change
Michael S. Northcott
University of Edinburgh, UK
Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change have failed to engage the nations in a cooperative approach to reducing the 
greenhouse gas emissions that are destabilizing the earth’s climate. Central to this fail-
ure is the resort to neo-liberal market techniques—and in particular markets in car-
bon emissions—for the management of emissions reduction. The resort to Carbon 
Emissions Trading (CET) reveals the problematic philosophical premises of economic 
neo-liberalism, which include a preference for anonymous algorithms as managers of 
human aﬀairs over face-to-face political communities and shared engagement of citi-
zens and corporations in practices that promote the common good of a stable cli-
mate. It is proposed in this article that a core task of the church’s public responsibility 
in relation to climate change is to oﬀer a theological critique of neo-liberal approaches 
to climate change mitigation and against these to advance a spiritual theology of 
cooperative action for the common good of a stable climate in which love for near 
and distant neighbours, and creatures, is the key metaphor.
Keywords
emissions, carbon market, climate change, love, power, common good
It was ﬁrst proposed by John Tyndall in 1859 that greenhouse gases—and 
especially carbon dioxide—play a role in regulating the diurnal temperature 
of the earth. In 1938 G. S. Callendar argued that fossil fuel burning was rais-
ing atmospheric carbon dioxide and that this had warmed the planet by one 
degree Fahrenheit. Charles Keeling demonstrated that atmospheric CO2 from 
fossil fuels was rising from a data set that he began in the 1950s at the Mauna 
Loa observatory in Hawaii. Data from thousands of weather stations and sat-
ellites indicate that the planet has warmed by an average of 0.8 degrees Cen-
tigrade since the industrial revolution, and that the rate of warming has 
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increased since the 1950s with the rapid growth in CO2 pollution.1 Despite a 
snowy winter on the United States Eastern Seaboard and in Northern 
Europe, January 2010 was the warmest January since satellite temperature 
records began, with land areas in the sub-Arctic region showing a warming 
of up to seven degrees Centigrade on the satellite average for the previous 
three decades. Hence there are bark beetles in Vancouver and Toronto, has-
tening the demise of hundred year old trees that were not seen, until recently, 
north of the 49th parallel, and beech trees are colonizing the edges of the 
Arctic ocean.
Scientiﬁc agreement—widespread if not universal—that carbon dioxide 
pollution could destabilize the climate system led to the inauguration of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, and it 
is now ratiﬁed by 194 member states of the United Nations. The Parties to 
the Convention acknowledge that ‘change in the Earth’s climate and its 
adverse eﬀects are a common concern of humankind’; that human activities 
are ‘enhancing the natural greenhouse eﬀect’; that ‘the largest share of green-
house gases originated in developed countries’; that ‘the global nature of cli-
mate change’ requires ‘cooperation by all countries’ in an ‘international 
response, in accordance with their common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities’; 
and that countries have a ‘responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States’.2 The Convention expresses a determination ‘to protect the climate 
system for present and future generations’ and to stabilize ‘greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.3 In sum the UNFCCC 
makes the claim that industrial gases are changing the earth’s climate, and 
that a stable climate is a universal common good whose preservation requires 
cooperative international mitigating action.
The ﬁrst international environmental law designed to stimulate preventa-
tive or mitigating action was the Kyoto Protocol which was ratiﬁed by 184 
parties to the UNFCC, though not by the United States of America. This is 
despite the fact that the United States has parked the largest share of green-
house gases in the atmosphere and remains the largest present emitter after 
1) For an overview of the emergence of the science see S. R. Weart, The Discovery of Global 
Warming (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
2) Text of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations 
(1992), <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf> [accessed 17 February 2010] 
(my italics).
3) Ibid.
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China. The majority of atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions were emitted 
from industrialized nations and the Kyoto Protocol committed thirty-seven 
of them to mitigation actions, mandating a per-country average of ﬁve per 
cent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the ﬁrst commitment period 
from 2008 through 2012. Despite the low target many will not meet it and 
hence the Protocol is widely seen as a failed treaty. Reasons for its failure 
include the low reduction targets, and the fact that they reduce pollution in 
less than a quarter of nations; that there are no enforcement mechanisms for 
countries that do not comply with reduction targets; that it inaugurated a 
neo-liberal regime of market instruments in carbon emission trading that, 
while making atmospheric pollution—and atmospheric space for pollution—
tradable products, do not promote physical reductions in pollution.4 The 
likely net eﬀect of the Kyoto Protocol ﬁrst commitment period will be at best 
a twenty or thirty year delay in anthropogenic warming of around 0.2 degrees 
Centigrade.5 Nonetheless the Protocol has many defenders, not least in the 
developing world, as was evident at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate confer-
ence, since it is the only existing legal instrument for greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. The principle the protocol enshrines of internationally agreed 
greenhouse gas emission reductions—that could be deepened in their eﬀects 
over time—is seen as too important to give up given the complexities 
involved in negotiating a new treaty.
Many resist the Kyoto Protocol not because its targets are ineﬀective but 
because the principle of UN-set emissions targets undermines the economic, 
and hence political, sovereignty of nation-states. This is a criticism most often 
heard in the Senate of the United States, which voted ninety-nine to one 
under Clinton-Gore against ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and remains stead-
fast in opposing any treaty restraining greenhouse gas emissions in the United 
States. The Senate also opposes the Kyoto Protocol since it does not require 
developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore 
it is said to disadvantage American businesses and employers relative to devel-
oping countries. Furthermore majority opinion in the US Senate is ‘climate 
sceptic’ and opposes the scientiﬁc argument that climate change is related to 
human activities.
4) J. T. Roberts and B. C. Parks, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, 
and Climate Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 219 and 383; Larry Lohmann, ‘Carbon 
Trading, Climate Justice and the Production of Ignorance: Ten Examples’, Development, 7:3 
(2008), 1–7.
5) E. A. Page, Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations (London: Edward Elgar, 2006), 
p. 174.
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Since Copenhagen such ‘climate scepticism’ has grown in the USA, and in 
other Anglosaxon domains including the United Kingdom and Australia.6 In 
the UK a BBC poll in February 2010 revealed that only twenty-six per cent 
of the population believe it is established that ‘climate change is largely man-
made’.7 In Australia a new climate sceptic political party has been launched 
and the cap and trade legislation of Kevin Rudd’s government was voted 
down in the Senate.8 Climate Scepticism has been fuelled in the UK and 
beyond by extensive media discussion of evidence published on the ﬁrst day 
of the Copenhagen conference of putative scientiﬁc manipulation of Chinese 
weather station and tree-ring data sets at the University of East Anglia’s Cli-
mate Research Unit.9 Journalists then identiﬁed a small number of signiﬁcant 
errors in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, the body which is commissioned by the UNFCCC to col-
late scientiﬁc data on climate change and to report on its policy implications. 
The most signiﬁcant ﬂaw was the erroneous claim that the Himalayan gla-
ciers—the largest body of ice outside the Poles from which more than 
1.3 billion people derive fresh water—would melt by 2035.10 Neither story 
invalidates scientiﬁc observations of rising temperatures, acidifying oceans, 
melting ice, spreading deserts and drying forests, but these media stories pro-
mote the idea in the public mind that the case for anthropogenic global 
warming and the challenge it represents to the industrial, consumer lifestyle 
is unproven.
The Copenhagen conference of 2009 was intended to update the Kyoto 
Protocol, including mandating more robust levels of greenhouse gas reduc-
tion in developed countries and drawing developing countries into the pro-
cess so that growth in emissions would peak before 2020 and then begin to 
decline. However fundamental disagreements over matters agreed at previous 
Conferences of the Parties—the legitimacy of the Kyoto Protocol, the deﬁni-
tion of dangerous climate change as an average warming above two degrees 
Centigrade, the science of anthropogenic climate change, the eﬃcacy of 
 6) K. Strassell, ‘The Climate Change: The Number of Sceptics is Swelling Everywhere’, Wall 
Street Journal (29 June 2009).
 7) ‘Climate Change Scepticism ‘On the Rise’, BBC Poll Shows’, BBC News (7 February 2010), 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8500443.stm> [accessed 16 February 2010]. 
 8) A. Barrowclough, ‘Australian Climate Policy Destroyed as Senate Votes Against Carbon 
Legislation’, The Times (2 December 2009).
 9) R. J. Cicerone, ‘Ensuring Integrity in Science’, Science, 327 (5 February 2010), 624.
10) RealClimate, ‘IPCC Errors: Facts and Spin’ (14 February 2010), <http://www.realclimate
.org/index.php/archives/2010/02/ipcc-errors-facts-and-spin/> [accessed 17 February 2010]. 
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carbon markets—prevented any comprehensive treaty being agreed in 
Copenhagen. The ﬁnal plenary agreed to note the existence of a ‘Copenhagen 
Accord’—a brief memorandum drawn up by the Premiers, or deputies, of the 
United States, China, India and Brazil—but the Accord is not a legal instru-
ment or treaty.11
What many regard as the failure of the Copenhagen Conference accompa-
nies the failure of the UNFCCC process, and the Kyoto Protocol, to impact 
in a detectable way on the geochemical footprint of the global economy on 
atmospheric greenhouse gases. The Mauna Loa record of the presence of CO2 
in the atmosphere shows an inexorable rise throughout the eighteen years of 
the existence of the UNFCCC, including the ﬁrst commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, as the scientiﬁc brieﬁng to the Copenhagen 
Conference states, ‘global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels in 2008 
were 40% higher than those in 1990’.12 The failure of the Kyoto Protocol to 
restrain global growth in greenhouse gas emissions is in marked contrast to 
the Montreal Protocol, which was signed into law in 1987 and led to restric-
tions on the use of, and then a global ban on the production of, the principal 
ozone depleting chemicals. So eﬀective is the global ban that atmospheric 
concentrations of chlorine began declining in 1997. The annual atmospheric 
ozone hole over Antarctica and the Southern Ocean has stabilized and will 
likely begin shrinking by 2023.13
The failure of the UNFCCC, as compared to the treaty process that led to 
the Montreal Protocol, is in part because of the greater complexity involved 
in regulating fossil fuel production as compared to chloroﬂourocarbons. The 
latter were only made by a small number of companies and the largest of 
them—Dupont—had already invented an alternative. But the failure also 
reﬂects a shift in underlying philosophical values that corrode belief in the 
value of cooperative action and shared practices for the achievement of a 
global common good, such as a stable ozone layer or a stable climate. This 
11) The text of the Copenhagen Accord is part of the minutes of the last day of the Copenhagen 
Conference (7–18 December 2009), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf> [accessed 17 February 
2010].
12) I. Allison, N. L. Bindoﬀ, R. A. Bindschadler et al., The Copenhagen Diagnosis: Updating the 
World on the latest Climate Science (Sydney: UNSW Climate Change Research Centre, 2009). 
13) P. A. Newman, E. R. Nash, A. R. Douglass, et al., ‘Estimating When the Antarctic Ozone 
Hole will Recover’, in C. Zerefos, G. Contopoulos and Gregory Skalkeas, eds, Twenty Years of 
Ozone Decline (New York: Springer, 2009), pp. 192–200. 
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shift is evident in the reliance of the Kyoto Protocol on market techniques, 
and in particular Carbon Emissions Trading, for achieving international miti-
gation of greenhouse gas pollution.
In essence CET schemes involve the imposition by government of regula-
tory caps on emissions by greenhouse gas polluters, beyond which they are 
required to purchase permits to pollute. Companies or agencies that pollute 
below the cap can sell permits to others that pollute above the cap. Permits—
eﬀectively corporate carbon oﬀsets—are traded in carbon markets, some of 
which operate within and some beyond national boundaries. A number of 
trading schemes are already in operation but the two largest, and with the 
longest track records, are the Clean Development Mechanism and the Euro-
pean Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Neither scheme has demonstrably 
reduced global emissions of CO2 which have been rising at four per cent per 
year since 1990.
Billions of dollars have been invested in inventing and managing new car-
bon markets but this commitment of resource, and of human ingenuity, is 
misdirected.14 Instead of physically reducing carbon emissions through invest-
ment in energy conservation, and in technologies such as carbon capture and 
storage and renewable energy, CET establishes accounting procedures that 
permit polluting corporations to justify their continuing pollution through 
the gift to them, or purchase by them, of permits to pollute which are trade-
able in the growing number of carbon exchanges around the world. So many 
carbon permits have been issued in the various carbon schemes by public 
authorities that the price of carbon per tonne is so low as to provide no 
incentive to reduce pollution or save energy. Consequently emissions trading 
merely legitimates existing levels of corporate pollution through market 
instruments and hence many industrialized countries will not meet their 
Kyoto commitments to physically reduce carbon emissions by 2012, though 
they will have bought international carbon permits to ‘justify’ their excess 
emissions.
Investigations of the workings of the principal CET schemes—the Clean 
Development Mechanism and the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme—reveal signiﬁcant ﬂaws and widespread fraud in their operation.15 
The biggest element of fraud in the Clean Development Mechanism relates 
14) L. Lohmann, Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation and 
Power (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Centre, 2006), p. 118.
15) H. Bachram, ‘Climate Fraud and Carbon Colonialism: The New Trade in Greenhouse 
Gases’, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism , 15 (2004), 5–20.
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to the need to estimate ‘additionality’. The international market in carbon 
oﬀsets is predicated on the assumption that monies made available through 
the CDM provide incentives for projects such as renewable energy plants that 
would not otherwise be built. However research reveals that two thirds of 
CDM projects were either completed or planned before the CDM was estab-
lished, which indicates that payments from the CDM are not incentivizing 
these projects and that therefore no greenhouse gas emissions have been 
avoided as a consequence of the disbursement of CDM funds.16
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, like the CDM, has a 
negative record in motivating real emissions reductions but the reasons for its 
failure are only in part because of the diﬃculty of ensuring additionality. 
Under the EUTS, nations are allotted rights to pollute, and the requisite 
number of permits, on the basis of their emissions in 1990, but trade in such 
permits has not motivated real reductions in carbon emissions. This is partly 
because permits were given away for free, or very cheaply, under a practice 
known as ‘grandfathering’, to companies whose power generation had emis-
sions large enough to require the purchase of permits. It is also because caps 
on emissions were set unduly liberally in relation to 1990 emissions.17
The initial theoretical advancement of CET by economists was based on 
the broader claim, ﬁrst advanced by Coase and Dales, that markets are typi-
cally more eﬃcient at resolving social and environmental costs or ‘market 
externalities’ than government regulation and/or taxes.18 The ﬁrst major trial 
of emissions trading took the form of an amendment to the Clean Air Act in 
1990, which inaugurated a new Acid Rain programme in the United States. 
The programme created a market in permits to emit sulphur from coal and 
oil-burning power stations and motivated annual sulphur emissions reduc-
tions of four million tons per annum.19 Emissions trading is said to be more 
eﬃcient than command and control source-speciﬁc approaches to pollution, 
16) B. Haya, Failed Mechanism: How the CDM is Subsidizing Hydro Developers and Harming the 
Kyoto Protocol (London: Rivers International, 2007); M. W. Wara, Michael and D. G. Victor, 
‘A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Oﬀsets’, Working Paper (2008) Stanford Univer-
sity, <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_ﬁnal_ﬁnal.pdf> [accessed 2 February 
2010].
17) S. Clò, ‘Grandfathering, Auctioning and Carbon Leakage: Assessing the Inconsistencies of 
the New ETS Directive’, Energy Policy, 38 (January 2010), 42–51.
18) R. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1960), 1–33; 
J. H. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1968).
19) R. Schmalansee, P. L. Joskow, A. D. Ellerman, J. B. Montero and E. M. Bailey, ‘An Interim 
Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12: 3 
(1998), 53–68.
 M. S. Northcott / International Journal of Public Theology 4 (2010) 294–313 301
because choices on how to cut emissions are left to market actors to achieve 
for themselves on the lowest cost basis.20 However claims for the success of 
this approach in the United States do not compare its eﬀects with regulatory 
approaches to the same problem in other domains but rather with previous 
command and control abatement schemes within the United States, which 
achieved lower rates of compliance and higher costs from litigation. Never-
theless, the United States is a uniquely litigious jurisdiction in which corpo-
rations regularly behave along ‘rational choice’ lines, estimating the relative 
costs of compliance with pollution regulation against the payment of ﬁnes for 
non-compliance should government agencies ﬁnd out and seek to punish 
them. For it to be proven that market solutions are always cheaper than other 
approaches, it would have to hold true not just in the USA but in countries 
such as Germany and Sweden, where corporate compliance with environ-
mental legislation is much greater.
The economistic preference for emissions trading over other approaches to 
carbon regulation and reduction indicates a number of problematic philo-
sophical premises that are not discussed in the economic literature on emis-
sions trading. The ﬁrst is that any value in the earth system is only fully 
estimable and realizable when it becomes part of the human economy of pro-
duction and is given a money value. Thus, if there is a value to the avoided 
harms that a proportionate reduction in greenhouse gas emissions represents, 
this value is said to have more productive power when it is translated into 
monetary terms and becomes tradable against other values. This premise goes 
back to the political theology of John Locke for whom values in the earth are 
not intrinsic but arise from human activities in making the earth fertile and 
productive.21 Locke enunciates the ﬁrst theological justiﬁcation for the domi-
nance of money values in modern political economy, when he proposes that 
money is the means by which work is preserved from the decay that aﬄicts 
the fallen natural order, since it is ‘some lasting thing that men might keep 
without spoiling’.22
The Lockean theology of money is of especial signiﬁcance in the context of 
an increasingly monetized global order. It was Aristotle who ﬁrst enunciated 
20) A. D. Ellerman, P. L. Joskow, R. Schmalansee, J. B. Montero and E. M. Bailey, Markets for 
Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
p. 253.
21) See the fuller exposition of Locke’s theology of money in M. S. Northcott, A Moral 
Climate: The Ethics of Global Warming (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2007).
22) J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980 [1690]), 
section 47 p. 28.
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the view that money is sterile and that therefore money should not be given 
‘life’ by being lent at interest.23 This position is central to Patristic and scho-
lastic prohibitions against usury and endures until the Reformation. Thus for 
Martin Luther, when money has power it endangers the fecundity and fertil-
ity of human life, and even of the earth. He argues—and here his argument 
is troublingly anti-semitic—that the Jews in the Hebrew Bible experienced 
the loss of the fertility of the land of Palestine, about which the prophets 
complain, because they had begun to lend money at interest, and taken up 
other kinds of prohibited behaviours, including idolatry. In so doing they 
had rendered their culture ‘inorganic’ and hence, Luther argues, the soil of 
ancient Israel was depleted and could no longer sustain life.24
The biblical description of idolatry is indicative of the root problem with 
neo-liberal models of political economy. Idols are things made with human 
hands. When things are given undue power over people this is no idle mat-
ter; it is not only that power given to idols is power not given to God but 
that power given to idols becomes malevolent and harms those who ascribe 
such power to idols. Money which is given power through usury becomes an 
idol and misshapes human society and the earth. Furthermore, idolatry in 
the Hebrew Bible is linked with such proscribed practices as child sacriﬁce, 
debt slavery and abuse of the earth.25 By analogy the cultural power conferred 
on mathematically-described markets over human aﬀairs, including environ-
mental pollution, becomes instrumental to the sovereignty of markets which 
malignantly misshape or ‘pollute’ (to use the language of the Hebrew prophets) 
both society and nature. To put this in onto-theological terms markets are 
signiﬁers that acquire an independent, idolatrous existence from what they 
signify. Over time the signiﬁers acquire mystifying power so that they become 
conventions.26 Markets in money, debt, carbon and consumer goods all fuel 
the growth in greenhouse gas emissions that are threatening climate stability. 
These markets signify material suﬃciency and sustenance, but they acquire 
23) B. N. Nelson, The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 73–82.
24) M. Luther, On the Jews and Their Lies in Luther’s Works, vol. 47, ed. Franklin Sherman 
(Augsburg: Fortress Press, 1971), p. 211. See also B. Stephenson and S. Power Bratton, ‘Mar-
tin Luther’s Understanding of Sin’s Impact on Nature and the Unlanding of the Jew’, Ecotheol-
ogy, 9 (2000), 84–102. 
25) S. C. Barton, ed., Idolatry: False Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism, and Christianity (Lon-
don: T&T Clark, 2007).
26) J. Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 
p. 58.
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such cultural power that money and consumption become independent activ-
ities that bear no relation to the physical needs of people or the physical state 
of ecosystems. Markets in carbon are idols that legitimate the continuation of 
a consumptive industrial economy and the continuing sacriﬁce of the com-
mon goods of a stable climate and a liveable earth for future generations. In 
this perspective naming and resisting the spiritual disease of idolatry becomes 
the crucial public work of the church, and of theologians, in relation to cli-
mate change.27
The second philosophical premise involved in the advocacy of Carbon 
Emissions Trading as the principal instrument for mitigating climate change 
is a preference for a utilitarian ethic in which good and bad actions are set in 
a calculus of consequences that are collectively aggregated. The focus in such 
calculi is entirely on theoretical end states, since those who perform such sums 
as a means of judging between diﬀerent courses of action cannot know in 
advance the actual end state. Alternatives to utilitarian and consequentialist 
approaches to the good include agent-centred or virtue theory, and act-cen-
tred, command-ethics approaches (also known as deontological approaches). 
In the former an action and its consequences may only be judged good or bad 
by reference to the character of the agent who performs it. In the latter an 
action may be judged good or bad on the basis of the action itself. The recog-
nition of the rightness or wrongness of kinds of agency and kinds of acts in 
relation to the environment, as preceding human aggregation of environmen-
tal goods into useable products and services, reﬂects a diﬀerent moral frame 
to the utilitarian calculus. In perhaps the most famous enunciation of this 
position, Aldo Leopold argues that ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when 
it tends otherwise’.28
This approach recalls the classical and medieval natural law tradition in 
which the extent of human interference in the natural order was understood 
to be limited by the creaturely dependence of human beings on the natural 
order.29 That there is relative stability in the natural order is seen by Aristotle 
and Aquinas as evidential of certain natural laws that are set into the struc-
ture of being by a divine and provident creator. This gives to natural order 
27) A. McIntosh, ‘What Price the Earth?’, World Mission, 33 (February 2010) <http://www.
alastairmcintosh.com/articles/2010-CofS-WM-Climate.pdf> [accessed 21 February 2010].
28) A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1968). 
29) M. Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996).
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both a physical and a moral force in human aﬀairs, and in the understanding 
of the nature of the human good, and constrains human interference in natu-
ral systems.30 The utilitarian perspective is part of a distinctively modern turn 
in the conception of the moral frame, which is understood as constructed by 
humans in contradistinction to the natural order. This turns moral reasoning 
inwards upon the speciﬁcally human construction of values that Charles Tay-
lor characterizes as the ‘turn to the self ’.31 For many environmental philoso-
phers it is this anthropocentric turn in modern ethics that is the root of the 
larger ecological crisis. For environmental philosophers Arne Naess and 
Holmes Rolston III, the recovery of respect for nature requires ways of esti-
mating interest and value that do not treat of other creatures as merely ﬁnd-
ing value in human cognition but as having intrinsic interests and values that 
frame human agency and actions.32 In this approach human agency in the 
world is shaped by biology as well as culture.
The third and related premise on which neo-liberalism requires critique 
and resistance concerns the neo-liberal description of human agency. In 
rational choice theory individual consumers and producers act rationally 
when they behave autonomously and seek to maximize their own preferences 
or interests. This account of human action is not just a description. As an 
idolatrous signiﬁer it acquires cultural power through its adoption in what 
Bruno Latour and Michel Callon call actor-networks.33 The extension of 
markets into new areas of social life, including environmental protection, 
trains people and organizations in the pursuit of private property rights and 
private goods, instead of cooperative practices and the shared pursuit of com-
mon goods. As Stanley Hauerwas argues, recognition of the common good 
by individual moral agents requires training in cooperative practices, such as 
those involved in playing orchestral music or running a youth club. The key 
in such practices is a politics in which individuals recognize ‘how their own 
30) C. Wilson, ‘From Limits to Laws: The Construction of the Nomological Image of Nature 
in Early Modern Philosophy’, in L. Daston and M. Stolleis, eds, Natural Law and Laws of 
Nature in Early Modern Europe (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 13–28.
31) C. Taylor, The Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
32) A. Naess, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements: A Summary’, 
Inquiry, 16 (1973), 95–100; H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the 
Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).
33) M. Callon and B. Latour, ‘Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-Structure 
Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So’, in K. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel, 
eds, Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-
Sociologies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 277–303.
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particular goods contribute to the common good’, for actors in such practices 
experience a sense of connection ‘between their own ends and purposes and 
the ﬂourishing of their political society’.34 Such practices of necessity are local 
in character and will need some measure of protection from impersonal and 
global market forces, if they are to be sustained. This is because, as Alasdair 
MacIntyre argues, cooperative action for the common good requires that it is 
conducted on ‘a scale in which questions put to those who hold political 
oﬃce make possible a deliberative debate from which no one from whom 
something might be learned is excluded’.35
Carbon markets operate on a global scale and involve the creation of sev-
eral levels of concealment between market actors, such that the ‘black box’ of 
the carbon market trade reveals no real information about eﬀorts to conserve 
energy or reduce reliance on fossil fuels.36 Added to the concealing black box 
in which burned and saved carbon are made equivalent, is the suppression of 
local knowledge of, and hence power over, energy, forest and land resources, 
where these markets are operative.37 Tribal peoples who manage their forest 
habitats through common property practices lose knowledge and power over 
their forests when they are drawn into carbon emissions trading schemes, 
such as Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest degradation in 
Developing countries or ‘REDD’, in which corporately owned plantations 
are considered tradeable and attract carbon credits while old growth forests 
lived in sustainably by indigenous peoples do not.38
Against the utilitarian and rational choice preference for market aggregates 
and algorithms, such as the black box of the carbon market, Elinor Ostrom 
in her extensive work on the governance of the commons describes an 
impressive array of practices and institutions that traditional communities 
have evolved for the sharing of common resources such as forests, ﬁshing 
34) S. Hauerwas, ‘A Worldly Church: Politics, Theology and the Common Good’, in P. M. 
Candler and C. Cunningham, eds, The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universal-
ism (London: SCM Press, 2010), pp. 9–28.
35) A. MacIntyre, ‘Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good’, in Kelvin Knight, ed., The 
MacIntyre Reader (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1998), pp. 234–52.
36) D. MacKenzie, ‘Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the Politics of Car-
bon Markets’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, 34 (April 2009), 440–55.
37) L. Lohmann, ‘Carbon Trading, Climate Justice and the Production of Ignorance: Ten 
Examples’, Development, 51 (September 2008), 359–65.
38) L. Lebel, A. Contreras, S. Pasong and P. Garden, ‘Nobody Knows Best: Alternative Per-
spectives on Forest Management in Southeast Asia’, International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics, 4 (June 2004), 111–27.
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grounds, grazing lands and water catchments.39 Ostrom’s Nobel prize-win-
ning work on the commons reveals that individual moral agency is enhanced, 
not diminished, when people negotiate and work together in face-to-face 
communities to manage use rights for the common good. That an agential 
approach to valuing ecological goods is superior to the black box approach is 
also indicated by a cross-national study of compliance with international 
environmental treaties. It reveals that in those domains which have the most 
active civil societies, the largest number of NGOs and the most politically 
engaged citizenry, governments both ratify more international environmental 
treaties and achieve a higher level of compliance.40 Hence, we may infer that 
compliance with and respect for environmental goods as internationally 
deﬁned is not just procedural, as economists propose, but agential, and the 
economistic argument that CET is more eﬀective because it has a lower pro-
cedural cost is invalid. CET is a set of mechanistic procedures that promise 
to deliver pollution reduction without requiring that corporations, cities, 
local communities and householders actively cooperate together to care for 
the climate by reducing their use of energy and commissioning renewable 
sources of power.
The preference for mathematical models and market mechanisms over par-
ticipatory forms of personal deliberation and engagement in actions towards 
a common good, such as a stable climate, may be traced to the inﬂuence of 
Newtonian physics on neoclassical economists, who modelled their mecha-
nistic accounts of human exchange relations, and the valuing procedures of 
the ‘laws’ of supply and demand, on nineteenth century physics.41 Neo-lib-
eral economists, like their nineteenth century forbears, adopt descriptive 
metaphors, and construct models of human and monetary behaviours that 
rely more on mathematics than on historical studies of empirical human 
behaviour. Inveigled by the claims for such models to provide reliable meas-
urements of, and hence tools for managing, human aﬀairs governments 
extend the realm of market technique into more areas of public service provi-
sion, including electricity supply, while shrinking participative mediation by 
the governed or by non-proﬁt non-governmental agencies. The result is that 
government and local agencies in service provision—from transportation and 
39) E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
40) Roberts and Parks, A Climate of Injustice, pp. 188–9.
41) P. Merowski, More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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telecommunications to education and health care—are increasingly mar-
ketized and privatized. At the same time government regulation of the bank-
ing sector, money markets and private corporations is reduced and economists 
and bankers have invented an array of extremely complex forms of trade in 
money, derivatives, futures, debt, spread-bets on stocks and exchange rates, 
and carbon emissions credits. These complex mathematical techniques con-
ceal the levels of debt and leverage that companies and consumers rely on to 
pay for goods and services in an increasingly monetized environment. Hence 
they reduce the transparency of the physical and monetary assets and con-
tractual relationships of which these markets are mathematical abstractions. 
The eﬀect is to produce what Walter Wriston calls the ‘twilight of sover-
eignty’, in which the power of human communities and nation-states to 
order their aﬀairs according to shared deliberation on moral ends, and the 
common good, is given up to autonomous market instruments based on the 
movement of bits of mathematical information between computers.42
The novel markets economists invent in ‘securitized debt’ or carbon emis-
sions credits generate huge amounts of human activity, and monetary wealth, 
and the descriptors grow to have more cultural power than the actual reality 
of the supply of housing relative to demand and the ability to pay for it, or 
the supply of emissions credits relative to greenhouse gas reduction targets. 
This gap between description and reality is evident in the aetiology of the 
banking failures and the ﬁnancial collapse of 2008. However, the cultural 
power of economic actor-networks remains, even though the algorithms 
failed to predict the ﬁnancial collapse and the banks and mortgage lending 
were shored up with government funds. In a similar way the failure of mar-
kets in carbon emissions to motivate real reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions was not acknowledged at the Copenhagen climate conference, and the 
Copenhagen Accord still describes market instruments as the primary device 
for international cooperation on climate change mitigation.
Market instruments are not autonomous, but humanly made. They exalt 
exchange values, and mathematical algorithms, over intrinsic worth and per-
sonal and political participation and deliberation on such exchanges. These 
mathematical models are not just descriptions of social reality; through the 
actor-networks in which their performative power is symbolically aﬃrmed 
42) W. B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming 
Our World (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1992).
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they remake society, government, citizen behaviours and beliefs.43 The net 
eﬀect is to transfer economic and political power from citizens, local commu-
nities and national parliaments to economic corporations, banks and money 
managers.
Recovering Moral Agency in a Global Neighbourhood
Contemporary globalization links people and places thousands of miles apart 
in myriad daily exchanges of goods, including food, drink, clothing and 
energy resources. The governance of these spatially distant exchange relation-
ships by market technique and money managers conceals the character of 
these global exchanges. This concealment eviscerates the capacity of individu-
als and communities in one place to deliberate morally and politically on the 
social and ecological impacts in other places of the material exchanges on 
which they rely for sustenance and comfort. Climate change is already aﬀect-
ing people on other continents, and in particular in Africa and Asia, where 
droughts and ﬂoods are reducing the capacity of vulnerable communities to 
grow food and to ﬁnd secure shelter. Distant global trades in energy intensive 
goods and in fossil fuels, as well as in carbon credits, are part of a global 
industrial nexus that is polluting the atmosphere and forcing the climate into 
a warmer phase. This nexus makes of distant peoples neighbours not by prox-
imity but by the journeys goods and people and pollutants make. 
If algorithmic governance prevents moral deliberation on these journeys 
how might Christians and others recover moral agency in relation to the 
material exchanges with global neighbours that sustain and so promote the 
common good of a stable climate? A journey plays a pivotal role in the Para-
ble of the Good Samaritan in the telling of which Christ is responding to the 
question from the scribe: ‘And who is my neighbour?’ (RSV, Luke 10:29). 
The question is a reasonable one and concerns how to judge which moral 
responsibilities the command to love the neighbour imposes on the individ-
ual at any particular moment. Christ’s answer suggests that the Samaritan 
becomes neighbour to the man who is robbed, because he meets him on the 
road in the course of a journey from Jerusalem to Jericho. The Samaritan and 
the robbed man do not live in the same street and they are not friends or rel-
atives, but they become proximate; they are put into a relationship of obliga-
43) Callon and Latour, ‘Unscrewing the Big Leviathan’, in Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, eds, 
Advances in Social Theory and Methodology.
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tion one to the other, because they are connected by a journey. The parable 
indicates that human beings cannot equally love every human being. Only by 
favouring some above others with moral concern is it possible to rank moral 
responsibilities and act accordingly, and the conventional principles that 
inform this ranking are place and proximity. Yet the mobile material ﬂows, 
the journeys of goods and services, that characterize a modern cosmopolitan 
life create what Karl Barth called ‘near and distant neighbours’.44 Moreover, 
they require new forms of moral discernment that honour the life of the 
neighbour who is not proximate to us, whom we may never meet even on a 
road, but who may suﬀer the ecological or social impacts of these journeys.
If neighbour relations are created by global trade then the Christians in 
Holland and England, who inaugurated a new form of moral deliberation 
over international trade, known as ‘fair-trade’, found a new way to love their 
global neighbours.45 Fair-trade involves a range of practices designed to 
ensure that contracts to supply distantly traded tropical goods, such as 
bananas, tea, coﬀee and chocolate, between developed country purchasers 
and developing country producers are morally just and not coercive. To 
assure that a particular contract to supply a commodity is just in the terms 
required by ‘fair-trade’ involves careful scrutiny of the social and ecological 
conditions of each speciﬁc product line that carries the fair-trade logo, from 
ﬁeld to market. This scrutiny involves face-to-face contact between the pur-
chasing company and the producer, in the course of which the purchaser and 
the producer put in place working and environmental conditions and proﬁt 
sharing arrangements that ensure that the product is sustainably and justly 
produced, and that the fruits of the contract are equitably shared in the com-
munity where the product is made.46
Fair-trade has raised living standards signiﬁcantly in the developing coun-
try communities that have entered into fair-trade contracts, by ensuring that 
distant trades are fair and just and do not involve coercive working condi-
tions or ecological destruction. Yet market economists, and state oﬃcials, 
resist the spread of such supply-chain scrutiny into the mainstream of market 
44) K. Barth, ‘Near and Distant Neighbours’, in K. Barth, Church Dogmatics III.4: The Doctrine 
of Creation, trans. A. T. Mackay, T. H. L. Parker, H. Knight, H. A. Kennedy and J. Marks 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), pp. 285–323.
45) On the Christian origins of fair-trade see M. S. Northcott, ‘Fair-trade and Human Wellbe-
ing’ in J. Atherton and E. Graham, eds, Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing: The Practices 
of Happiness (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
46) G. Moore, ‘The Fair-trade Movement: Parameters, Issues and Future Research’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 53 (August, 2004), 73–86.
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exchanges, because the degree of discernment and face-to-face meeting 
involved in such exchanges is more costly, and less eﬃcient, than anonymous 
price allocation mechanisms. Instead they promote an increasingly borderless 
and deregulated international trading regime, governed by the World Trade 
Organization, which disallows member states from discriminating against 
goods whose production is characterized by coercive exploitation of workers 
or by ecological destruction.47 Similarly energy and trucking companies initi-
ated a law suit to resist eﬀorts by the State of California to ban the sale of oil 
derived from tar sands in Alberta Canada, or from corn-derived ethanol, 
because of their very high environmental and global warming impacts.48
Fair-trade is a work of love in which charity is added to economic rela-
tions, transforming potentially coercive or ecologically destructive relation-
ships into relationships where humanity and the earth are loved as 
neighbourhood. The publicity of this work of love, which has extended far 
beyond its ecclesial roots, can inform cooperative international eﬀorts to mit-
igate climate change and aid those worst aﬀected by the natural disasters it 
brings in its train. The internationally connected cooperatives of producers 
and consumers who began the fair-trade movement are an important exem-
plar of the kind of ethical and participative network that is needed for the 
complex international project of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and so 
protecting the climate. Climate change mitigation requires the same detailed 
attention by active citizens, as producers and consumers, to the ethics of fos-
sil fuel extraction and use, and to the other sources of greenhouse gas emis-
sions—such as deforestation, agricultural animals, cement factories—that 
must be addressed by any comprehensive eﬀort to mitigate climate change. 
Further, climate change mitigation requires the same eﬀort to practice justice 
in the relations between developed and developing world, since the ‘moral 
storm’ of climate change is that while the developed world’s historic and 
ongoing emissions remain the principal drivers of climate forcing, it is the 
developing world that is, and will, suﬀer the worst eﬀects of climate change 
over the next ﬁfty years and beyond.
Despite the failure of the UNFCCC to date to achieve it, an eﬀective envi-
ronmental treaty mandating the reduced extraction and use of fossil fuels 
47) For a fuller account see M. S. Northcott, ‘The World Trade Organisation, Fair-trade and 
the Body Politics of Saint Paul’, in John Atherton, ed., Through the Eye of a Needle: Theology, 
Ethics and Economy (London: Epworth Press, 2007), pp. 169–88.
48) M.  Roosevelt, ‘Industries Sue to Void California’s Low-Carbon Fuel Regulations’, Los Angeles 
Times (3 February 2010).
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remains the desirable outcome of the international negotiating process it has 
set in train. Yet it is doubtful that local communities, corporations and agen-
cies, and the nations they constitute, will accede to the behaviours and prac-
tices of climate care that an eﬀective climate treaty will require, without the 
shared recognition by signiﬁcant numbers of individuals and communities 
within each nation that, though distant in time and space, the victims of 
greenhouse gas pollution have a moral claim on them and they have a duty 
to love them as neighbours.
Some will question the realism of the suggestion that love and not law can 
be the motive behind an international response to climate change. Arch-
bishop Rowan Williams, in his sermon during the Copenhagen conference 
to a congregation that included the Queen of Denmark, ambassadors and 
international delegates to the conference, argued that love could be the 
motive when he preached on 1 John 4:18 ‘perfect love casts out fear’. He 
stated that: ‘The deepest religious basis for our commitment to the environ-
ment in which God has placed us is this recognition that we are called to be, 
and are enabled to be, the place where God’s love for the world comes 
through’.49
The basis of Christian conﬁdence in loving action towards creation is that 
it mirrors the love of God revealed in the original goodness of creation. 
Whereas the negative emotion of fear—such as that provoked by apocalyptic 
accounts of ecological disaster—is unlikely to motivate the lifestyle changes 
that the ecological crisis requires. As Williams argues, ‘the truth is that what 
is most likely to get us to take the right decisions for our global future is love’, 
and not only love of neighbour but love of God’s creation, of the ‘world we 
inhabit’.50
This account of love as the spiritual root of moral transformation echoes 
the Orthodox ethics of Christos Yanarras for whom good work and acts of 
virtue ﬁnd their meaning and purpose when they ‘manifest God’ and reveal 
the divine image in the actor.51 As the fourth century desert father St Makar-
ios put it: ‘It is in the renewal of the intellect, in the peace of our reasonings, 
and in love and heavenly eros for the Lord that the new creation of Christians 
is distinguished from all other men of the world. This was why the Lord’s 
49) Rowan Williams, ‘‘Act for the sake of love’: Archbishop of Canterbury Preaches in Copenha-
gen Cathedral’, <http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/2673> [accessed 16 February 2010].
50) Ibid.
51) C. Yannaras, The Freedom of Morality (Crestwood: St Vladimir Seminary Press, 1984), 
pp. 76–9.
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coming took place’.52 In Orthodox theology the human heart is a microcosm 
of the whole cosmos, and of the transforming presence of the church within 
it, and works of charity and mercy are the form of the restoration of creation 
which begins in the lives of the saints. As Isaac the Syrian puts it: ‘What is a 
merciful heart? A heart which burns for all creation, for men and birds and 
animals and demons, for every creature’.53
The moral force of acts of religious charity is understood by political scien-
tists as a form of ‘social capital’ that represents a ‘resource’ for generating 
social trust and the ‘production’ of the common good in society. The collec-
tive form of this social capital according to Corwin Smidt is the ‘network of 
social friendships and reciprocity’54 through which churches, and parachurch 
organizations, build forms of diakonic outreach in society. Yet this instru-
mentalist description misses the spiritual character of ecclesial community, 
and the spiritual origin of works of love in the love of God and in the love of 
God’s creatures. Many churches and Christian environmental organizations 
around the world are demonstrating their love for God and creation in shared 
and networked actions to mitigate their own climate impacts by commission-
ing renewable electricity generation, and sharing alms with those, particularly 
in the south, who are already suﬀering from climate change. Lutheran 
churches in Germany and Switzerland have put solar panels on south-facing 
church roofs and used the money saved from their energy bill to sponsor 
renewable power in churches in Africa. The Christian environmental organi-
zation Interfaith Power and Light in the United States has contracted to sup-
ply renewable supply to churches, and to the power grid, in more than thirty 
states across the nation, while at the same time educating church members in 
energy conservation, home insulation and in lower carbon living, including 
transportation and diet.55 In the UK the Ecocongregation network is encour-
aging local churches to connect creation care, and climate care more espe-
cially with Christian worship, as well as with the ecological footprint of the 
local church and the homes and lives of their members.56 In addition, the 
Church of England has commenced a ‘Shrinking the Footprint’ project in 
52) The Fifty Spiritual Homilies of Makarios 5.5, as cited by Yannaras, The Freedom of Morality, 
p. 78.
53) Isaac the Syrian, Mystic Treatises, 81, as cited by Yannaras, Freedom of Morality, p. 80.
54) C. Smidt, ‘Introduction’, in Corwin Smidt, ed., Religion as Social Capital: Producing the 
Common Good (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2003), pp. 1–18 at p. 9.
55) ‘Interfaith Power and Light: A Religious Response to Global Warming’, <http://interfaith-
powerandlight.org/about/> [accessed 16 February 2010]. 
56) ‘Ecocongregation’, <http://www.ecocongregation.org/> [accessed 1March 2010].
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which every church and diocese seeks not only to reduce its energy consump-
tion and to educate churchgoers in climate care, but also to use funds so 
saved to support renewable energy projects and climate adaptation projects in 
the developing world.57 These works of love do have cultural power but more 
than ‘social capital’ this power emanates from the spiritual challenge they 
present as signiﬁers of true worship that resists the idolatry of market tech-
niques, as manifest in endless consumption and in the neo-liberal subversion 
of international cooperation for the common good of a safe climate.
Kierkegaard, Copenhagen’s most famous philosopher, argues in his Works 
of Love that Christianity is the world’s greatest philosophy because it makes of 
love the supreme duty, the ‘royal law’ of the philosopher king Jesus Christ. 
No other philosophy—pagan or rationalist—marries love and law, and so 
turns desire into duty, in this way. By so doing Christianity secures love as 
humanity’s end, for ‘only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally 
secure’.58 To secure a stable climate is a common good that requires acts of 
love and sacriﬁce beyond those envisaged by corporate and political leaders 
in Copenhagen in 2009. The church remains a place in which such acts of 
love are both ascetic disciplines and the Christ-inspired embodiment of true 
human ﬂourishing. Hence solar panels on church roofs, bicycles outside Sun-
day services, Christians who refuse to ﬂy and drive and wind farms commis-
sioned by Christian climate activists are not just examples of ecclesiastical 
footprint shrinking but the publicity of love in a time of climate change.
57) ‘Shrinking the Footprint’, The Church of England, <http://www.shrinkingthefootprint.cofe.
anglican.org/> [accessed 16 February 2010].
58) S. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. H & E. Hong (New York: Harper, 1962 [1847]), pp. 
11–17.
